ABSTRACT With the integration of Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) technology coming into our lives, more and more NB-IoT terminals are connected to the network to meet various requirements of users. However, the traditional authentication process between the NB-IoT devices and the 5G core network brings heavy communication and storage overheads. Besides, large-scale connected NB-IoT devices are vulnerable to attacks from adversaries, especially for devices that are used to collect and transmit sensitive data and information. Therefore, it is extremely important to simplify the authentication process and ensure the security and privacy of the data transmission process. In this paper, we propose a certificateless multiparty authenticated encryption scheme for NB-IoT terminals in 5G networks. The proposed scheme not only achieves multi-party authentication in the access authentication process but also provides identity anonymity and non-repudiation. The processes of access authentication and data transmission are combined into one process in our scheme. When multiple NB-IoT terminals simultaneously perform access authentication, the information of terminals and encrypted private data are sent to the Access and Mobility Management (AMF), and the AMF verifies the validity and security of the data by verifying the generated certificateless aggregated authenticated ciphertexts. Security analysis and experimental results show that our scheme is secure and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of mobile communication technology and the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to the dispersion of application scenarios and too many standards. Besides, the development of industry and applications is also a major problem. To solve these issues, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Committee implemented the core standard for NB-IoT in June 2016 [1] - [6] . The emergence of these globally recognized standards, which has low power consumption and wide coverage, promoted heterogeneous networks. In RUSH, an anonymous authenticated key agreement is realized for handovers in various scenarios based on the techniques of chameleon hash functions and blockchains [11] , [12] .
With the NB-IoT technology blending into our lives, more and more NB-IoT devices are connected to the network to meet the diverse needs of users. These connected NB-IoT devices are vulnerable to attack by adversaries, especially for those that are used to collect and transmit sensitive data and information. Once an attack results in information leakage, it will be a huge loss. Therefore, the privacy protection of user identity and data security guarantee in the access authentication and data transmission process are extremely important.
A. RELATED WORK
Up to now, many protocols are focusing on access authentication for security in LTE-A networks [13] - [17] . Also, many researchers are focusing on 5G security and privacy [18] - [20] . In [21] , mutual authentication is implemented between the NB-IoT device (IOTD) and the AMF, but the signaling overhead of this scheme is relatively large. In [22] , after the first IOTD implements the authentication with the AMF, the remaining devices can achieve the authentication with the AMF by using the group key, which can simplify the authentication process. However, it still needs to send a large number of access requests resulting in a large amount of signaling overhead. In [23] , a large number of request messages can be aggregated into a single message. And the broadcast mechanism can be used to send messages to the group of a device. But this scheme requires a lot of computational overhead. In the LGTH scheme [24] , the lightweight authentication can be achieved by using symmetric cryptography techniques. However, there are some security risks in this scheme, such as Dos attacks and lack of identity protection. In Basudan's scheme [25] , a privacypreserving data transmission protocol has been proposed. This scheme can achieve authenticity with low signaling overhead. However, it can not achieve multi-party authentication. In [26] , a rapid authentication of a large number of NB-IoT devices is implemented, but it can not achieve multiparty authentication. In our scheme, efficient multi-party access authentication of multiple NB-IoT terminals and AMF can be realized, and data of terminal devices in the multi-party authentication process can be securely transmitted to the 5G core network. Also, we use data aggregation technology to reduce communication overhead [27] . To improve efficiency and reduce computational complexity, we connect to multiple NB-IoT terminal devices in the 5G core network for aggregation authentication. The polymerization efficiency can be guaranteed in our scheme.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, To overcome the security and privacy issues in 5G, we propose a multi-party authenticated encryption scheme. Compared with the related schemes, our scheme not only realizes multi-party authentication in the access authentication process but also provides identity anonymity and non-repudiation. The processes of access authentication and data transmission are combined into one to improve efficiency. When multiple NB-IoT terminals simultaneously perform access authentication, the information of the terminal and the encrypted private data are sent to the AMF, and the AMF verifies the validity of the NB-IoT device and checks whether the data has been tampered with via verifying the generated certificateless aggregate signcryption ciphertexts. Our contributions are as follows.
• We propose a certificateless multi-party authenticated encryption scheme for NB-IoT terminals. In our proposed scheme, an efficient multi-party access authentication between multiple NB-IoT terminals and AMF can be realized, and the data in the multi-party authentication process can be securely transmitted to the 5G core networks.
• Privacy identity protection provided in our scheme is based on anonymous. In our scheme, each user registers with KGC to generate a registration serial number. The serial number instead of the user's real identity in the data transmitted and authenticated phase for privacy preservation.
• In the proposed scheme, we use the certificateless aggregation and signcryption method to ensure the security and integrity of the data in the process of data transmission and authentication.
• In our scheme, we use data aggregation technology to reduce communication overhead. To improve efficiency and reduce computational complexity, we use aggregation authentication for IOTDs connected to the 5G core network. The aggregation technique ensures the efficiency of the system.
• Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure, and performance comparisons demonstrate that our scheme is better than other related schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the system model and requirements. In section III, we define the algorithm used in the scheme. In the section IV, we describe our proposed scheme exhaustively. The detailed security proof in Section V and performance evaluation are given in section VII, respectively. Finally, the section VIII summarizes the full text.
II. MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. SYSTEM MODEL 5G wireless access network mainly includes 5G access network and 5G core network. The 5G access network mainly includes the following two nodes: gNB and ng-eNB. gNB provides NR user plane and control plane protocols and functions for 5G network users. ng-eNB provides NR user plane and control plane protocols and functions for 4G network users, between gNB and gNB, between gNB and ngeNB. The interface between ng-eNB and gNB is the Xn interface. As shown in Figure 1 , the 5G core network mainly includes the following nodes: AMF, Session Management Function (SMF), and User Plane Function (UPF). AMF is primarily responsible for accessing mobility management functions for access control and mobility management. The SMF is primarily responsible for the session management function, which sets up and manages sessions and is associated with network policies. UPF is mainly responsible for user plane functions. Depending on the type of service, UPFs can be deployed to various configurations and locations. Our system model mainly involves three kinds of different entities: the Key Generate Center (KGC), the IOTD and the AMF. As shown in Figure 2 .
• KGC: The KGC is an honest and trusted entity. It is trusted by other entities. Its role is to generate system public parameters and Initial-Partial-key for IOTD and AMF according to their identity ID.
• IOTDs: The IOTDs is a lot of NB-IoT devices, which transfer data to the AMF.
• AMF: The function of the AMF is to perform aggregation authentication on the data sent by the IOTDs, and decrypt the data successfully authenticated.
B. SECURITY MODEL
In this part, we propose a security model, based on the assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Two types of adversaries with different abilities are considered [28] .
• Type I. This type of adversary does not know the master key but can initiate a public key replacement attack.
• Type II. This type of adversary knows the master key but can not make a public key replacement. Next, we use two games to define the unforgeability of the two adversaries A 1 , A 2 .
Game1. A challenger C performs the initialization algorithm, obtains the master key msk and system public parameters params, secretly saves msk, and exposes the parameters params. A 1 makes the following query to C.
User-Key-Gen(ID • A 1 does not query part of private key and full private key of ID * .
• A 1 does not query signature on message msg * of ID * .
• A 1 can replace the public key of ID * .
• Signature s * i is valid for msg * i . Game2. A challenger C performs the initialization algorithm, obtains the master key msk and system public parameters params, secretly saves msk, and exposes the parameters params and msk to A 2 . A 2 makes the following query to C.
User • A 1 does not query user-side private key and full private key of ID * .
• Signature s * i is valid for msg * i .
C. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
In the system model, the air interface between the NB-IoT device and the network is not secure. Attackers can pretend to be NB-IoT devices for a variety of protocol attacks, including replay attacks, redirect attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and simulated attacks. Therefore, each NB-IoT device needs to perform authentication when accessing the network, and encrypt the data when transmitting. Specifically, our scheme should satisfy the following requirements.
1) Multi-party authentication:
When a large number of NB-IoT devices are connected to the network, AMF authenticates all simultaneously. 2) Anonymity and identity privacy protection: During the multi-party authentication process between the NB-IoT device and the network, each NB-IoT device uses an anonymous substitute identity to ensure that the identity information of the NB-IoT device is not stolen by an attacker. 3) Confidentiality and integrity of data: We scheme to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data from the NB-IoT devices. 4) Resistance to protocol attacks: Our scheme resists existing protocol attacks such as eavesdropping, replay attacks, redirect attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and simulated attacks. 
III. PRELIMINARY A. COMPLEXITY AND ASSUMPTION
In this part, we describe the complexity and assumption.
1) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH).
Let P be a generator of group G. Given a tuple (P, aP, bP) ∈ G for a, b ∈ Z * q , it is hard to compute abP. 2) Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Let P be a generator of group G. Given a tuple (P, aP) ∈ G for a ∈ Z * q , it is hard to compute a [28] . 3) CDH assumption. No algorithm can solve CDH with non-negligible probability during the expected polynomial time. 4) DL assumption. No algorithm can solve DLP with non-negligible probability during the expected polynomial time.
B. ALGORITHM DEFINITIONS FOR OUR SCHEME
A certificateless multi-party authentication encryption scheme consists of seven algorithms: Setup, User-Key-Gen, Initial-Partial-Key-Gen, Partial-Key-Gen, Authen-Enc, Multi-Aggregate-Authen-Enc, and Multi-Aggregate-AuthenDec, which are detailed as follows. 
The authenticated encryption algorithm is performed by {IOTD i } i∈I . Suppose IOTD i takes as inputs params, its public key PK i = (upk i , ppk i ) and corresponding secret key SK i = (usk i , psk i ), the public key PK M of a target and a message msg i , the algorithm generates an authenticated encryption ciphertext ACT i . 6) Multi-Aggregate-Authen-Enc(params, {ACT i } i∈I ) → ACT : The multi-authenticated encryption algorithm is performed by AMF. On input params and a set of authenticated encryption ciphertexts {ACT i } i∈I , the algorithm returns a multi-party aggregate authenticated encryption ciphertext ACT . 7) Multi-Aggregate-Authen-Dec (params, SK M ,
The multi-party aggregate authenticated decryption algorithm is run by AMF. It takes as inputs params, SK M , {PK i } i∈I and ACT , and outputs msg = {msg i } i∈I , if is a valid multi-party aggregate authenticated encryption ciphertext, otherwise it outputs ⊥ to quit.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed scheme in detail. In our scheme, we will use the traditional NB-IoT scenario with a large quantity of NB-IoT devices as our application scenario, and the devices are mainly used to send data packets. We assume that KGC is an honest and trustworthy entity in this paper. Our proposed scheme mainly consists of two phases: Initialization phase and Data transmitted and authenticated encryption phase, which is detailed as follows. The notation used in our scheme is shown in Table 1 .
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, the KGC performs system initialization to generate the system public parameters firstly. Secondly, IOTDs generate the user-side private key and the corresponding public key. Thirdly, each IOTD provides its user-side public key to get an initial-partial-key the KGC generates. And IOTDs generates a partial key using the initial-partial-key generated by the KGC and the private key of IOTDs. The AMF generates its user-side key and partial key according to the same method. The detailed description is as follows.
1. System initialization. During the system initialization phase, the KGC run a common algorithm Setup(1 λ )to acquire the initial parameters.
Setup(1 λ ) → (params, msk): Upon receiving a security parameter λ, KGC chooses a cyclic additive group G of prime order q. Suppose P is the generator of G. KGC choose s ∈ R Z * q and computes P pub = sP. Then, it chooses four hash functions H 0 , H 1 , H 2 and H 3 . Finally, parameters {G, P, q, P pub , H i{0≤i≤3} } is published and msk = s is kept secret by KGC.
2. User key generation. In this phase, the user public key and private key are generated by executing three encryption algorithms: User-Key-Gen, Initial-Partial-KeyGen and Partial-Key-Gen. As shown in Figure 3 , which can be described in detail as follows.
• User-Key-Gen(params, ID i ) → (upk i , usk i ): Suppose a user has an identity ID i , where i ∈ I . It randomly chooses x i ∈ R Z * q and computes X i = x i P. Then, it sets upsk i = X i and usk i = x i . After that, a messages including the IOTD i 's identity ID i and the user-side public key upk i = X i is sent to the KGC.
• In this phase, the data transmitted securely by {IOTD i } i ∈ I for a while can be authenticated non-interactively by AMF. When the IOTD i is active to connect to the network in order to transmit data, the encrypted data and the related authentication information of the IOTD i , the signcryption results are generated by IOTD i . Then the AMF generates the aggregate signcryption results and verifies the {IOTD i } i∈I together based on the aggregate signcryption results. Finally, the AMF decrypts the message msg i . As shown in Figure 4 , the process is illustrated in detail as follows. 
1) Authen-Enc(params,
Each IOTD i selects a random number v i ∈ R Z * q and performs the following steps. a) 
e) Then, AMF checks that the equation SP = V + R + h 1 P pub + i∈I h 3,i X i is true. If the equation does not hold, stop going on and ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, the signature will be valid and thus AMF ensures the received is valid and belongs to the legal IOTD i . For i ∈ I , does the following steps. f) Compute h 2,i = H 2 (ID M V i Z i ). g) Set msg i = h 2,i C i,2 . Then, AMF outputs msg = {msg i } i∈I .
V. SECURITY EVALUATION A. SECURITY PROOF
In the following, the security of our scheme will be illustrated.
Theorem 1:
Assume that CDH is a hard problem, the signature is unforgeable under the random prediction model when facing the attack of A 1 .
Proof 1: Assume that A 1 can break through our scheme with a certain probability. A challenger C is constructed. A 1 is used to solve the CDH problem by C. C obtains a set of instance (X = aP, Y = bP). In this instance, chosen a, b ∈ Z * q and P ∈ G and the goal is to compute abP. In order to avoid conflicting answers to queries,
User-Key-Gen(ID i ) Queries: After receiving an identity ID i , if ID i has been queried, C returns the existing x i . Otherwise, it chooses randomly x i ∈ Z * q , compute X i = x i P and return
Initial-Partial-Key-Gen(ID i ) Queries: When A 1 queries the identity ID i , C checks if the last element of the corresponding tuple is 1. If it is 1, aborts. Otherwise, C performs the following steps [19] .
• If ID i = ID * , C queries User-Key-Gen to obtain(ID i , x i , X i ). Then C chooses the random number r i ∈ R Z * q and computes R i = r i P, h 1,i = H 1 (sn i X i R i ), and y i = r i + sh 1 
• If ID i = ID * , C randomly choose e i ∈ {0, 1}, if y i =⊥,
Partial-Key-Gen(ID i ) Queries: When A 1 queries the identity ID i , if ID i has been queried, C checks if the last element of the corresponding tuple is 1. C returns d i , if is not 1 and aborts otherwise. If ID i is not queried, C queries User-Key-Gen obtain (ID i , x i , X i ), and queries Initial-Partial-
Replace-Public-Key(ID i , pk i ) Queries: C sets pk i = pk * i and updates the corresponding tuple in L pk . Authen-Enc(ID i , msg i ) Queries: C executes the following signature process.
• C selects a random number v i ∈ R Z * q and compute V i = v i P.
• Return the signcryption (V i , s i ) to A 1 . Now A 1 can verify that the signature is legal by checking the equation s i P = V i +R i +h 1,i P pub +h 3,i X i is hold. Suppose the adversary forge the public key pk i as pk * , and the forged signature of the message msg is s * . Satisfy the equation s * P = V * + R * + h 1,i P pub + h 3,i X * , thus, C solves the CDH hard problem, which contradicts our hypothesis.
Theorem 2: Assume that DLP is a hard problem, the signcryption is unforgeable under the random prediction model when facing the attack of A 1 .
Proof 2: Assume that A 2 can break through our scheme with a certain probability. A challenger C is constructed. A 1 = 2 is used to solve the DLP problem by C. C obtains a set of instance (X = aP, Y = bP). In this instance, chosen a master key s ∈ Z * q , P pub = sP. Then C sends and params to A 2 . In order to avoid conflicting answers to queries, C maintains empty lists
Queries as follows.
User-Key-Gen(ID i ) Queries: After receiving an identity ID i , if ID i has been queried, C returns the existing x i . Otherwise, C performs the following steps.
• If ID i = ID * , C chooses randomly x i ∈ Z * q , computes X i = x i P and return
• If ID i = ID * , C randomly choose e i ∈ {0, 1}, if e i = 0, C does like the case of ID i = ID * and insert
to L ipsk and aborts.
Full-public-key(ID i ) Queries:
Authen-Enc(ID i , msg i ) Queries: C executes the following signature process.
• C selects a random number v i ∈ R Z * q and computes V i = v i P.
• Return the signcryption (V i , s i ) to A 2 . Now A 2 can verify that the signature is a legal by checking the equation s i P = V i +R i +h 1,i P pub +h 3,i X i is hold. Suppose the adversary forge the public key pk i as pk * , and the forged signcryption of the message msg is s * . Satisfy the equation s * P = V * + R * + h 1,i P pub + h 3,i X * , thus, C solves the DLP hard problem, which contradicts our hypothesis.
B. FURTHER ANALYSIS
The following six security goals can be achieved in our scheme.
1) The Correctness of Signcryption: In our proposed scheme, the equation SP = V +R+h 1 P pub + i∈I h 3,i X i is used to verify the legal of the aggregate signcryption results. It can make the following proof.
Multi-party authentication: Our scheme can achieve Multi-party authentication between IOTDs and AMF. AMF can authenticate IOTDs with a valid aggregation signcryption. And the aggregation signcryption is generated by AMF. Without the correct private key, the attacker cannot generate valid signcryption and aggregation signcryption. 3) Data privacy and integrity: To transmit the data securely, the data is encrypted and integrity protected with certificateless aggregation and signcryption technique. Only a legitimate can use its private key and AMF's public key to compute the signcryption. And the aggregation signcryption is generated by AMF.
Only the valid AMF can use its private key and each IOTD's public key to verify the aggregation signcryption and decrypt, respectively. Furthermore, in our scheme, signcryption is used to protect the integrity of the transfer data. 4) User anonymity: Privacy identity protection provided in our scheme is based on anonymous. In our scheme, each user is registered with KGC, and KGC generates a corresponding registration serial number for each user. The serial number instead of the IOTD's real identity, which is used in the Data transmitted and authenticated encryption phase for privacy preservation. Only KGC knows the true identity of the user corresponding to the serial number. 5) Attack resistance: We prove that our scheme can resist multiple attacks, including replay attacks, eavesdropping and man-in-middle attacks.
• Replay attacks: Our scheme resists replay attacks by selecting the random numbers to generate signcryption.
• Modification attacks: In our scheme, a valid message (s i , V i , C i ) contains its signature s i . If the attacker makes any modification on the message, we will find it easy to verify the equation SP = V + R + h 1 P pub + i∈I h 3,i X i .
• Impersonation attacks: In our scenario, suppose an adversary pretends to be a legitimate IOTD device to send false messages to AMF. AMF can easily find out by verifying the equation
• Man-in-the-middle attacks: In our scheme, manin-the-middle attacks can be prevented. message (s i , V i , C i ) contains its signature si,
, s is the system private key, except KGC is available, no one can get it, including IOTD and AMF. 6) Signaling Congestion Avoidance: Our scheme is based on certificateless aggregation and signcryption technology to aggregate access request messages sent by multiple NB-IoT devices, which greatly reduces the signaling flow and simplifies the access authentication process. In addition, we combine the data transmission process and the access authentication process into one, which greatly reduces the burden on the network.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYZE
In this section, we will analyze the performance of our proposed scheme in signaling consumption and computational consumption with the related schemes. In Table 2 , we present the symbol definition.
A. SIGNALING OVERHEAD
In this section, we compare the signaling consumption of our scheme with the existing scheme according to the number of signaling messages. By the use of the control plane optimization mechanism, the NB-IoT system can accomplish the access authentication and data transmission process simultaneously, and thus greatly reduces the signaling flows. Since the other related schemes [21]- [23] , can only implement the access authentication process without the involvement of data transmission process, all of which can be applied to the LTE-A network, we assume that these schemes should employ the same optimization transmission mechanism as the current standard to accomplish the secure data transmission. In the current standard, each terminal requires six signaling messages to establish a data bearer. In [21], the NB-IoT device and the AMF need 6N + 7N = 13N signaling messages to achieve mutual authentication. In [22] , after the first NB-IoT device implements the authentication with the AMF, the remaining devices can achieve the authentication with the AMF by using the group key, which includes the process of completing the authentication of the first device, and it requires (2K + 5N ) + 6n = 11N + 2K signaling messages. In [23] , a lot of request messages can be aggregated into a single message. The broadcast mechanism can be used to send messages to the group of a device, which N + 3K + 6N = 7N + 3K signaling messages are required. In our scheme, the NB-IoT device and the AMF need 3N signaling messages to achieve a multi-party authentication. The comparison of the total signaling message is shown in Table 3 . The comparison of the total signaling overhead with K=10 and K=20 is given in Figure 5 . From Figure 5 , it can be verified that our proposed scheme is much better than the other related scheme.
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
In this paper, we mainly consider the following three computation overheads: a point multiply operation time T M , a pairing operation time T P and a hash function operation time T H . To prove the efficiency of our scheme, we implement the above operations on a Laptop (Lenovo with Intel I5-3320M 2.6GHZ processor, 4G bytes memory and the Windows 7 operating system) using the JPBC library. The respective runtime is listed in Table 4 . Table 5 . The comparison of computational consumption of the related scheme is given in Figure 6 . From Figure 6 , it can be verified that our proposed scheme is better than [23] .
In the scheme [21], the cumbersome mutual authentication process leads to large signaling overheads. In [22] , after the first IOTD implements the authentication with the AMF, the remaining devices can achieve the authentication with the AMF by using the group key, which can simplify the authentication process. However, it still needs to send a large number of access requests resulting in a large amount of signaling overhead.
Since our scheme uses the public key algorithm, it is more computation cost than the schemes [21] and [22] , but our aggregation-based scheme makes signaling overhead far superior to the above schemes [21] and [22] . Besides, our scheme is more secure than the scheme [21] and [22] . In our scheme, an efficient multi-party access authentication of multiple NB-IoT terminals and AMF can be realized, and data of terminal devices in the multi-party authentication process can be securely transmitted to the 5G core network. In the process of data transmission, we use the certificateless aggregation and signcryption to ensure the security and integrity of the data. Moreover, compared with the scheme [23] of the public key algorithm, our scheme is superior to this scheme in both signaling overhead and computational overhead.
VII. CONCLUSION
NB-IoT has received great attention in the 5G networks, as NB-IoT terminals can access 5G core networks with low overhead. However, these terminals still use traditional EPS-AKA access authentication mechanisms for authentication, which brings a large number of signaling overhead. In this paper, we proposed a multi-party authentication for massive NB-IoT devices in 5G networks, effective multi-party access authentication between multiple NB-IoT terminals and AMF can be implemented, and data of terminal devices in the multi-party authentication process can be securely transmitted to the 5G core networks. Besides, we use data aggregation techniques to reduce communication overhead, and our scheme can guarantee the aggregation efficiency. 
